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Subject Matter:  
On October 20-23 2010, faculty from the Naval Postgraduate School led a US-UK Strategic 
Dialogue “The State of the Special Relationship” which was sponsored by the Advanced 
System and Concepts Office of the US Defense Threat Reduction Agency and co-hosted by 
King’s College of London. The conference evaluated the US-UK “special relationship,” 
explored its transformation since the 2003 decision to invade Iraq, and gathered perspectives 
from scholars and government officials regarding future relations between the allies.  
 
Method of Analysis:  
Participants were asked to address shared national experiences in Iraq, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, US-UK relations and the war on terror, the state of intelligence collaboration, 
Counter-Proliferation efforts directed toward Iran, and nuclear force postures. Each topic 
was addressed by a panel of experts.  These papers and presentations were then followed by 
a general discussion undertaken by all of the participants at the event.  
 
Findings:  
1. Members of the US defense community have expressed concerns about the 
effectiveness of British armed forces. Some of the cited examples were recent British 
tactical performance in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province involving COIN operations, 
the British experience in Iraq’s Basra Region, and US resentment of the perceived 
arrogance of some British generals. These have adversely affected the US operational 
and political confidence in the United Kingdom as a military partner. 
 
2. The UK public and official political towards Britain’s role in the world have changed. 
The report suggests that these evolving perceptions may have stemmed from what is 
perceived to be a lack of UK influence on US decision making regarding the decision 
to invade Iraq in 2003 and a decreased appetite for foreign intervention.  By contrast, 
US participants believe that British officials played an active and significant role in the 
decisions leading up to the decision to invade Iraq. 
 
3. Former UK officials made it apparent that the British Forces face significant 
budgetary constraints. This decline is typified by the Iraq experience, the perceived 
US loss of faith in the UK armed forces, and the political imperative to extricate 
quickly forces from Afghanistan. This overall reduction in defense capability is 
reinforced by the current global financial crisis and is reflected in the United 




4. Missions in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan have put a strain on the “special 
relationship.” This was partly due to how US-UK combat operations were managed.  
 
5. Differences in the US and UK legal frameworks have brought challenges to the 
“special relationship.” For instance, there is a major difference in tactics between the 
two countries regarding plea bargaining, which can cause delays and lack of 
permissible evidence in court. Taking legal action can be difficult as well because 
some US intercept evidence cannot be used in the UK court system. 
 
6. Counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism efforts continue to be strong areas of 
collaboration between the United States and the United Kingdom.   
 
7. It will be difficult for the United States and the United Kingdom to design or test 
new nuclear weapons. The ongoing financial crisis may influence how the British 
choose to build their nuclear program in the future. 
 
Conclusion:  
The Iraq issue will remain highly politically charged issue in British politics for the immediate 
future.   Americans appear willing to move beyond past events while the British seem 
uncertain about the meaning and lasting significance of the decision to invade Iraq, which is 
partly due to the fact that they feel their choice to maintain a strong relationship with the 
United States did not protect their best interests. How we manage this divergence in 





SECTION 1: BACKGROUND 
 
For over half a century, US and British officials have enjoyed a “special relationship,” an 
especially close form of military and diplomatic consultation and coordination that has come 
to be expected as a matter of course in Washington and London.  Some observers have 
taken a dim view of the relationship; in March 2010, for instance, the House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that the British government stop referring to 
relations with the United States as “special” because it conjured up images of subordination 
to Washington’s objectives.1  More recently, British Foreign Secretary William Hague noted 
that through Republican, Democratic, Conservative and Labor administrations, bilateral 
relations between Britain and the United States remained “excellent.”  The special 
relationship continues, but it is not immune from the stresses and strains created by external 
threats, errors of omission and commission, and changing geo-strategic realities. 2 
 
This report offers an assessment of the “special relationship” based on the findings of a 
recent forum that was held at the Lords of the Manor Hotel, Upper Slaughter, 
Gloucestershire, UK, on 20-22 October 2010.  British and American scholars and former 
officials from both governments were asked to address a series of themes and issues, with an 
eye toward exploring how these issues shape the state of the relations between the allies. 
Participants were asked to address shared national experiences in Iraq, Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, US-UK relations and the war on terror, the state of intelligence collaboration, 
Counter-Proliferation efforts directed against Iran, and nuclear force postures. The group 












SECTION 2: GENERAL FINDINGS 
 
Although the decision to invade Iraq and its aftermath are beginning to fade from political 
memory in the United States, both British officials and members of the public continue to 
question the political, intelligence and policy mistakes leading to the decision to topple 
Saddam Hussein. These issues are being kept at the forefront of public consciousness in the 
United Kingdom by the on-going official inquiry into the entire conduct of the Iraq 
campaign, ranging from the case for war all the way through to the withdrawal of UK forces 
several years later. The politics of the Iraq issue will remain highly charged at least until the 
Commission issues its report (which is not seeking to attach blame related to any decisions 
or their implementation but to identify lessons learned). British participants note that there is 
a widespread feeling across Great Britain that an obsequious attitude toward Washington’s 
demands led to British participation in some sort of US crusade in the Middle East.  In 
contrast, American participants noted that British officials were willing, active and valued 
participants in the decision making leading up to the Second Gulf War.  Americans appear 
willing to dismiss past events as “so much history,” while the British have difficulty coming 
to terms with decisions that they believe do not reflect their best tradition of level-headed 
and sophisticated strategic judgment.  This divergence in attitudes places ongoing issues in 
different contexts in London and Washington. 
 
General Finding 1 
 
Within the UK defense community, there is growing concern over the health and resilience 
of the US-UK operational relationship; problems have developed and continue to arise.  
 
An internal report circulating amongst UK defense and military officials shows a growing 
anxiety within Whitehall concerning the state of the US-UK military relationship. Notably, 
there are concerns that the relationship has begun to show signs of strain and possibly even 
cracks. 
 
Areas of the report explored perceived US concerns about the quality and effectiveness of 
British armed forces. Examples cited included: 
 
 Recent British tactical performance in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, in counter-
insurgency operations (COIN)  
 The British experience in Basra, Iraq; and 
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 US resentment of the perceived arrogance of some British generals 
 
Resentment is rooted in the British idea that the lessons of Northern Ireland, and other 
COIN campaigns, can be broadly leveraged in support of actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
However, the US Army arguably inflicted a great deal of this friction on itself during the 
initial years of the Iraq campaign, as Americans flooded the UK determined to reap the 
lessons from British COIN history. This certainly contributed to the problem, particularly in 
terms of the “perceived arrogance” of senior UK officers, and it was then compounded by 
the failings that followed in Basra. 
 




General Finding 2 
 
Despite frictions over Iraq and Afghanistan it is apparent that at the working level – in the 
military, intelligence and nuclear fields – the US-UK strategic relationship continues to 
function effectively. It is at the political level where there appears to be more friction, flux and 
divergence of views. This may partially be explained by the fact that US officials might be 
taking the UK contribution to various activities for granted in a political sense. It also may 
involve sensitivities in Britain about the fact that the current administration in the White 
House is less “UK leaning” and pays less attention than its predecessor to protecting British 
sensibilities (e.g. the “British” Petroleum controversy arising from the massive oil leak in the 
Gulf of Mexico in summer 2010).  
 
The UK has evidently been through, and continues to go through, a period of political soul 
searching when it comes to deploying military force, particularly as UK moral leadership 
since Iraq has been called into question. It is evident that the UK public and political moods 
have changed in terms of what Britain’s role in the world should be. Part of this due to 
perceptions of the lack of UK influence on US decision making in relation to Iraq and on 
other issues.  Part of it might be due to a decreased appetite for foreign intervention, in part, 
as a result of how the Iraq invasion was implemented and the lack of perceived progress in 
defeating the Afghanistan Taliban and ongoing governance problems in that country. The 
upshot is that the UK government is much less instinctively supportive of Washington and 
this has altered the UK political approach to the special relationship. Whether this is an 




Consequently it may become more difficult to maintain the coherence of the US-UK 
political relationship in the future if perceived interests and policy preferences begin to 
diverge. At one level this is a question of substance (e.g. is the United Kingdom likely to 
support military action against Iran in the future if the current diplomatic/sanctions track 
fails?). But it is also a question of process, notably: How can the British and Americans do 
grand strategy together in the future?  
 
General Finding 3 
 
There is a palpable sense among British and American observers that Britain is now in a 
serious decline militarily.  This decline is typified by the Iraq experience, the perceived loss 
of faith in the UK armed forces on the part of its number one ally, and the political 
imperative to extricate forces from Afghanistan as soon as possible. These challenges have 
been compounded by the global financial crisis and directly influenced the United 
Kingdom’s recent Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR). The SDSR was primarily a 
cost savings exercise driven by the requirement for all government departments to cut 
spending as part of its deficit reduction plan.  
 
The review was primarily a salami slicing exercise in terms of military capability but it will 
obviously result in a yet smaller set of military forces and a reduced capability in the context 
of NATO and in terms of contributing to other international deployments. The implications 
are probably multi-dimensional, for example: greater reliance on the United States; further 
interoperability issues with US armed forces if the United Kingdom does not invest in high 
technology; military intervention becoming the very last resort for UK governments; and 
increased collaboration by the UK and US with France and potentially other European 
countries in defense. These are just a few examples and all of these will have implications for 
US-UK strategic relations. There were also some very controversial decisions (some might 
say absurd) in the SDSR including scrapping the new Nimrod MR4 maritime patrol aircraft 
before it is brought into service, putting one of the two new aircraft carriers into mothballs 
as soon as it is built, and gapping the UK capability to fly aircraft off the other carrier. 
 
The “perfect storm” analogy may be too strong a phrase to describe the various factors that 
appear to be influencing the United Kingdom’s military decline, but the context within 
which British officials think about and plan for defense has changed significantly in recent 
years and this will undoubtedly influence the US-UK relationship as a result. The UK 
decision to withdraw militarily from east of the Suez Canal Zone may be a better reference 




SECTION 3: IRAQ, PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN 
 
Engaging in coalition combat operations has posed a series of challenges for the special 
relationship.  In terms of the experience in Iraq, British-American relations were strained by 
alliance disagreements over the resources devoted to various operations, differing 
approaches to COIN, and the apparent overextension of British forces in the region. British 
officials also have quietly questioned the US ability to plan for and execute a long and 
complex engagement in Iraq.  British officials were apparently fully aware of the American 
failure to consider various aspects of the situation in Iraq prior to the war there, but in the 
end followed the US lead when it came to operations and tactics.  
 
In terms of Afghanistan, coalition efforts have suffered severe mission creep.  US-UK forces 
are fighting the Taliban and Pashtu tribes in addition to Al Qaeda. Initially, the United States 
was not interested in incorporating allies into the overarching strategy in Afghanistan.  As 
the engagement deepened, however, US officials chastised their allies for not becoming 
involved.  US officials ultimately convinced their allies to assume greater responsibility while 
the US military attempted to shift its focus toward counter-terrorism operations. The allied 
forces were quickly left with diminished support and assets needed to accomplish their 
mission.  As setbacks occurred, US forces returned to areas that they had previously handed 
over to their allies (e.g. Helmand, Kandahar, etc.) and reassumed tactical and operational 
oversight.  This has led to hard feelings within the alliance. 
 
Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan Finding 1 
 
Securing the Basra region of Iraq is a British failure that has yet to be confronted. The UK 
forces struggled to commit adequate resources to both Iraq and Afghanistan. In spite of the 
initial successes in Basra, the UK forces failed to deliver rapid reconstruction and to manage 
force protection, protection of the populace, and elimination of insurgents. The UK forces 
refused to request US assistance, further contributing to the complexities of securing the 
region.  
 
The consequences of failure in Basra led to unprecedented UK civil-military frictions and an 
end to the European vision of muscular altruistic liberal interventionism.  British participants 
suggested that the United Kingdom lost credibility within the American political context, but 
US observers seemed to suggest that outside military circles, little notice was taken of British 
military performance during the occupation of Iraq, which in itself perhaps raises questions 
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related to the political “value” perceived to be attached in the United States to partnering 
with the United Kingdom, despite the long history of military collaboration. 
 
Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan Finding 2 
 
British officials faced a binary choice with regard to their decision to become involved in 
Afghanistan: Go or don’t go. The UK was unaware of US capability gaps, specifically those 
related to reconstruction and stabilization, and this lack of knowledge has negatively 
impacted their perception of the US military and government. There has been a general loss 
of confidence, especially among the political caste in British policy toward Afghanistan. 
Distrust between British and American officials goes both ways.  
 
COIN and utopianism are not easy ways to generate public support in the United Kingdom. 
Discussion regarding future “discretionary wars” should be done in private between the two 
governments. 
 
Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan Finding 3 
 
Most American participants believed that the legacy of the war in Afghanistan could be 
similar to that of Vietnam in that US policymakers will be leery to engage in future COIN 
operations.  If the past is a guide to the future, they also believed that the US military would 
be quick to abandon expertise and capabilities suited to COIN. 
 
In the future, the United States will be required to take on more combat burdens when 





SECTION 4: US-UK RELATIONS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 
 
The United States and the United Kingdom are confronting common terrorist threats.  The 
air link between London’s Heathrow airport and the United States, for instance, appears to 
be a favorite target of terrorists. The 2006 plot to destroy airliners, the 2009 New York City 
subway plot and elements of the Mumbai attack shared a transatlantic link. Both countries 
face threats from homegrown terrorism. Diaspora populations also pose unique challenges 
to law enforcement and intelligence officials. 
 
A major difference between US and UK counter-terrorism efforts is related to scale.  The 
United States has a large number of resources to draw upon and too many agencies to 
coordinate. 
 
US-UK Relations and the War on Terror Finding 1 
 
Cooperation between the two countries is extensive, but they are not unified in their views 
of certain groups.  For instance, some groups are not a priority for the United Kingdom, i.e. 
Hamas and Hezbollah, but are for the United States. 
 
US-UK Relations and the War on Terror Finding 2 
 
There is a major difference in tactics between the two countries regarding plea bargaining, 
the practice of allowing suspects to plead guilty to a lesser charge to quickly close cases. In 
the United Kingdom, plea-bargaining is non-existent and creating inducements to talk is not 
permissible.  The United States has found that this restriction leads to a loss of prosecutorial 
intelligence. 
 
Some US intercept evidence cannot be used in UK courts. How an interview is conducted in 
situations where the rule of law is not set in stone creates difficulties. The public safety 
exception to Miranda can create issues between the British and US legal systems. In the 
United States, the public safety exception is exercised to attain timely and tactical 




SECTION 5: COUNTERING PROLIFERATION:  
IRAN AS THE “HARD CASE” 
 
Counter-proliferation is perhaps the strongest field of collaboration between the United 
States and the United Kingdom.  Counter-proliferation, however, also tends to be a team 
sport: the United Kingdom drives the European Union agenda and thus helps to keep the 
European Union focused on the problem of Iran. The United States tends to play a larger 
role in leading the United Nations to enact sanctions, although sanctions tend to factionalize 
the international community. 
 
US and UK officials are better informed about proliferation matters compared to the leaders 
of many states.  They must use this superior knowledge to strengthen the efforts of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.  Both countries also must continue exchanges in order 
to maintain a shared technical and cultural approach to the problem of proliferation. 
 
Countering Proliferation: Iran as the “Hard Case” Key Finding 1 
 
The special relationship produces the danger of British complacency regarding the issue of 
proliferation.  British officials must recognize that they must bring substantial proposals to 
the international bargaining table as well as intelligence and other capabilities to the overall 
counter-proliferation effort. 
 
Countering Proliferation: Iran as the “Hard Case” Key Finding 2 
 
The United States and the United Kingdom must keep all parties united to take concerted 
action, especially by limiting procurement of nuclear materials from and through China. 
 
The UK-China relationship should be strengthened and this may be a key area in which the 
UK could usefully play a role in the counter proliferation context given the less strained 
relationship between the United Kingdom and China compared to the United States and 
China. 
 
Russia is the key to the success of United Nations sanctions. British and American officials 




The United Kingdom must maintain independent capabilities recognizing that there is a 




SECTION 6: NUCLEAR ISSUES 
 
The United States has committed itself in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review to reducing 
global nuclear dangers. The Nuclear Posture Review illustrates the push toward nuclear net-
zero.  Until net-zero is achieved, however, the United States is committed to maintaining a 
safe and effective nuclear arsenal. The United Kingdom’s approach to its white paper 
assisted the United States in articulating its position.  Although changes in the UK defense 
budget affect the US-UK relationship, cooperation dealing with nuclear issues is an 
especially robust element of the special relationship. The 10-year reviews of the 1958 
agreement on nuclear cooperation renew the relevance of this shared heritage. Despite this 
profound and enduring cooperation, the United Kingdom regards its nuclear capability as 
operationally independent and this independence makes the United Kingdom a valuable 
nuclear partner. 
 
Nuclear Issues Key Finding 1 
 
The United States and United Kingdom continue to face difficulty designing and testing new 
nuclear weapons. There are numerous domestic and international political challenges in 
maintaining or replacing warheads.  Control of materials will continue to be an issue. The 
aging nuclear infrastructure also poses significant issues. 
 
Compounding this issue is the lack of experience amongst junior scientists – the issue of 
tacit knowledge -- who were never involved in the original nuclear testing prior to the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The government has lost considerable institutional 
knowledge and tacit nuclear expertise since the signing of the CTBT. 
 
Nuclear Issues Key Finding 2 
 
In the United Kingdom, the domestic debate regarding the fundamentals of the program 
centers on two principal positions: maintaining nuclear weapons or disarming.  In the United 
States, policymakers tend to have their cake and eat it too – they talk about maintaining a 





One of the central arguments in the United Kingdom is that given the strength of the US-
UK relationship, what is the relevance of a UK nuclear force? Another British concern is 
that decreases in nuclear program spending increases dependency on the United States.  
 
UK domestic support for a nuclear program is not strong when compared to most other 
nuclear states. This is a product of the perceived high cost of the nuclear program. 
Controversy over the program typically coincides with international tension and replacement 
cycles. The public’s position on the nuclear issue in the United Kingdom is probably best 
characterized as apathetic, however. The 2006 White Paper is a testament to this as it did not 
generate significant political controversy. 
 
The on-going financial crisis and its impact on UK defense may well influence future British 
decision making on the nuclear question, such as contemplation of extending the life of the 
current Trident submarines. This decision in itself could add momentum to arguments for a 
more limited deterrent capability (notwithstanding the arguments for what makes a ‘credible’ 
deterrent) and even for disarmament over the longer term. 
 





Please direct questions or comments to 
 
James J. Wirtz, Ph.D. 
Dean, School of International Studies 
Naval Postgraduate School 














SECTION 7: AGENDA 
 
Wednesday, October 20, 2010 
 
6:00pm  Reception and Dinner 
Dining Room 
 
7:30pm  The State of the Special Relationship at Decade’s End 
 
Presenters:  John Dumbrell (University of Durham) 
   John Baylis (Swansea University) to introduce 
 
Thursday, October 21, 2010 
 
8:30am  Breakfast 
Dining Room 
 
9:00am-9:30am Welcome and Introductions 
Conference Room 
   
Presenters: James J. Wirtz (Naval Postgraduate School) 
Wyn Bowen (Kings College London) 
Bill Hostyn (ASCO-DTRA) 
John Baylis (Swansea University) 
Chair:   David Hamon (ASCO-DTRA) 
 
9:30am-11:30am Session 1: The Special Relationship and the New NATO 
Strategic Concept  
 
Presenters:  David H Dunn (University of Birmingham) 
Beatrice Heuser (University of Reading) 
Guy Roberts (NATO) 
Chair:   John Baylis (Swansea University) 
 
11:30-1:30pm Lunch  
Dining Room 
 




Presenters:  Paul Schulte (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)  
 Tim Wilsey (Royal Bank of Scotland) 
 Harold Ingram (US Department of State) 
 Thomas Johnson (Naval Postgraduate School) 
Chair:   David Hamon (ASCO-DTRA) 
 
3:45pm -4.00pm Break 
 
4:00pm-5:30pm Session 3: US-UK Relations and the War on Terror 
 
Presenters:  John Gearson (King’s College London) 
Andrew Silke (University of East London) 
 James Walsh (University of North Carolina of Charlotte) 
 Justin Tolomeo (FBI) 
Chair:  Wyn Bowen (King’s College London) 
 
7:30pm  Reception and Dinner       
            Dining Room 
 
Friday, October 21, 2010 
 
8:00am  Breakfast 
Dining Room 
 
8:30am-10:15am Session 4: Countering Proliferation: Iran as the ‘Hard Case’ 
Presenters:  Wyn Bowen (King’s College London) 
Jonathan Brewer (King’s College London) 
Daniel Moran (Naval Postgraduate School) 




10:30am-12:30pm  Session 5: Nuclear Issues 
 
Presenters:  Malcolm Chalmers (Royal United Services Institute) 
Robin Pitman (Imperial College London) 
Bob Vince (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) 
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2:00pm-3:30pm Session 6: Intelligence Collaboration after the Iraq Estimates 
 
Presenters:  Adam Svendsen (Security Studies and International Relations) 
Christian Westermann (U.S Department of State) 
 Chair:  Robert Dover (Loughborourgh University) 
 
3:30pm-4:00pm Open Forum 
 
Moderators:  James Wirtz and Wyn Bowen 
 
4:00pm-4:30pm Closing Remarks 
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1. Angela Archambault (Center on Contemporary, Naval Postgraduate School) 
2. David Hamon (ASCO-DTRA) 
3. Bill Hostyn (ASCO-DTRA) 
4. Harold Ingram (US Department of State) 
5. Thomas Johnson (Naval Postgraduate School) 
6. Sandra Leavitt (Naval Postgraduate School) 
7. Daniel Moran (Naval Postgraduate School) 
8. Guy Roberts (NATO) 
9. Justin Tolomeo (FBI) 
10. Bob Vince (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) 
11. James Walsh (University of North Carolina of Charlotte) 
12. Christian Westermann (US Department of State) 
13. James Wirtz (Naval Postgraduate School)  




1. Isabelle Anstey (King’s College London) 
2. John Baylis (University of Swansea) 
3. Wyn Bowen (King’s College London) 
4. Alison Brady (King’s College London) 
5. Jonathan Brewer (King’s College London) 
6. Amy Burgess (Cabinet Office) 
7. Malcolm Chalmers (Royal United Services Institute) 
8. John Dumbrell (University of Durham) 
9. David H. Dunn (University of Birmingham) 
10. Robert Dover (Loughborough University)  
11. John Gearson (King’s College London) 
12. Beatrice Heuser (University of Reading) 
13. Robin Pitman (Imperial College London) 
14. Lianne Saunders (Head, Counter-Proliferation Dept., Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office) 
15. Paul Schulte (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; King’s College London)  
16. Andrew Silke (University of East London) 
17. Adam Svendsen (SSIR) 
18. Tim Wilsey (Royal Bank of Scotland) 
 
